Training for Peace and Humanitarian Relief Operations
Advancing Best Practices

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Executive Summary

While the four communities in peace operations—governmental and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the military, and international civilian police—frequently find themselves sharing the same field of operation, their approaches to and structures for training for that interaction and the articulation of training needs are quite different. In the past, this has led to confusion, suspicion, and a diminished capacity for cooperative action among the communities. All sides recognize the benefits of and need for better coordination and increased operating efficiencies, but making the kinds of changes that are required will not be easy.

In an ideal world, all the participants in any given humanitarian response effort would share a common understanding of one another’s capabilities and limitations, as well as their roles and missions. Overlapping efforts would be kept to a minimum while cooperation in the pursuit of progress and solutions would be instinctive. In the real world, however, mission analysis is often ad hoc; training is spotty and tends to focus on individual agency goals, and coordination with other organizations is worked out on the fly. These were the main conclusions of a two-day symposium on best practices in conflict management training, sponsored by the U.S. Institute of Peace, June 25–26, 2001.

Another key difficulty civilian elements of the international community face is the trap of attempting to work “outside the box.” The governmental and NGO communities greatly value flexibility and creativity, often leading to early calls for innovative problem solving. Unfortunately, this premium on creativity also reflects the communities’ tendency toward “ad hocism” and the problem of having many officials, volunteers, and experts jump from crisis to crisis without ever learning enough about the details “inside” their respective boxes.

The communities come at the problems from different directions, sharing good intentions and a general recognition that somehow their coordination needs to be better. The difficulty lies in the details of responsibility sharing and the general lack of common training and preparation. Although the military and the international civilian police operate in more structured and content-based training environments, the U.S. government and NGOs come to the task from a process of experience-based learning that is less formal and better suited to their personnel. The key to better collaboration in the future is not training uniformity, as some espouse and others fear, but rather developing a method for regularly blending these disparate groups into training environments that allow them to learn with and from one another. Yet to do so, there must be an acknowledgment of some existing constraints.

The nongovernmental community faces some difficult challenges with regard to formalized training. Foremost among these is its members’ need to raise funds to carry out their missions. This is a constant need, which sometimes shapes the scope and timing of their interventions while indirectly affecting their ability to conduct internal training. Training requires money, and training costs increase organizational overhead. In an era
when donors and the media are increasingly focused on the bottom line and tend to rate humanitarian organizations by what percentage of donations goes to the ultimate beneficiaries, the need to explain and justify administrative costs is a pressing concern. The challenge for the near future is to promote an attitude within the NGO and the donor communities that the right kind of training increases organizational capacity for success in areas donors and major actors, such as the military, value.

The situation is similar within the myriad organizations of the U.S. government that routinely or occasionally become involved in “complex emergencies”—humanitarian relief operations that become more hazardous when warlords or competing factions try to capitalize on the chaos of a natural or man-made disaster and on the supplies the international community brings to the host country in an intervention. These organizations share with the NGO community a preference for experience-based training, and, lacking a systematic training curriculum on the management of complex emergencies, they tend to fall back on their personal skills and general knowledge of statecraft, development assistance, or interagency processes when such emergencies arise. It has been suggested that the two greatest impediments to collaborative training progress within this community are the lack of a single, full-time coordinating structure and the lack of a centralized training facility wherein members of the various organizations could come together to learn from one another and share a common training experience.

The idea of creating an interagency coordinating structure receives only lukewarm interest from relevant governmental agencies, which are reluctant to create a separate entity that would direct field operations from Washington, D.C. However, if the focus of that entity were confined to coordination, facilitation, and support, while preserving the agencies’ autonomy of action in the field of operations, such an entity’s value would be undeniable, particularly in the initial phases of an operation.

There is a similar reluctance to creating a standing, deployable cadre of trained individuals to facilitate operations in the field, though this model has proven its worth in joint military operations. For existing agencies, the perceived need is not for new or collateral organizations but for the better utilization of existing organizations and better coordination among them.

One segment of the international community engaged in peace operations that is steadily gaining acknowledgment and moving toward an improved training posture is international civilian police (CivPol). With the increased recognition that public security (that is, the maintenance of law and order in the broad sweep of social institutions) is a critical element in postconflict reconstruction, the scope of CivPol engagement is broadening, and organizations—particularly the United Nations—are paying more attention to harmonizing international CivPol training. CivPol contingents typically include volunteers and seconded law enforcement officers from more than seventy countries who come together in a variety of complex operations, so it is easy to see the need for common policing standards and practices.

CivPol training falls into two basic categories: training received at home before deployment and training received in the recipient country, including induction and specialized training. Predeployment training is the responsibility of the countries donating their police officers to the international mix. Countries approach police operations differently, and
their forces have different standards, levels of skill, and experience; they also have different views of the world that are based on their specific political cultures and legal traditions.

Induction and specialized training in the host country are largely the responsibility of those forces already deployed, though the UN has acknowledged that it has a role to play in helping to standardize this training. Such training should focus on local police practices, the administrative support structure, working with the local population and local police, expanding contacts for information on the local situation, reporting and communication procedures, coordination with other agencies and organizations, and team-building practices. In short, international civilian police are now being asked to do far more than simple monitoring. They are afforded great responsibility in unstructured, dangerous, and highly politicized environments that are often characterized by conflicting guidance and limited or nonexistent judicial systems. The expressed desire of many former CivPol officers and others working in peacekeeping missions is that international civilian police should have a standard training package; common uniforms, rank structure, and equipment; uniform disciplinary guidelines; a single chain of command; and more accountability.

The military is the only community that is imbued with a training culture and is given the resources to conduct significant, if not always adequate, training. Its primary mission and focus are combat training to fight and win the nation’s wars; proficiency training for this primary mission leaves little room for collateral training in other areas.

For example, the U.S. Army’s training system is built on a process of mission analysis, task identification and assignment, evaluation of current proficiency, and hands-on training designed to raise proficiency to required levels. Of all the groups involved in peace operations, it is the only one that has a systematized approach to identifying the skills needed to accomplish particular tasks. It highly values experience in the form of lessons learned, but it is largely devoted to content-based instruction that provides uniform skill training throughout the force.

Training for specific skills and tasks does not appear to have diminished the military’s capacity for innovation or its agility in responding to changing and uncertain circumstances. Rather, it broadens the core competencies of its members so that necessary adjustments new challenges pose can be made without much disruption. It also enables the military to reach out to other peace operation actors more easily and to see the synergy that can be achieved by active coordination. The natural reluctance of governmental and nongovernmental agencies to be seen as working with the military in complex emergencies has diminished in recent years, and NGOs in particular are finding that collaboration can benefit all parties.

To be sure, the two days of the symposium elicited some “best practices” for the conduct of training in peace operations. Yet, as was the case with the first symposium the U.S. Institute of Peace sponsored on “best practices,” more often the presentations and discussions defined areas where improvement was needed and possible.* The presenters offered a great deal of information and some surprising recommendations, and, as always, discussion from the floor was spirited and insightful.

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The discussions clearly identified individual and collective areas for future improvement. Collectively, the symposium's attendees suggested that regular participants in humanitarian and crisis intervention would benefit from increased peacetime interaction and communication, as well as from an ongoing synergistic process of building a common understanding of mutual strengths, weaknesses, and responsibilities in the field. In recent years, there has been some movement toward common training in joint exercises, seminars, and planning forums, but this effort has been largely hit-and-miss; what progress there has been must be institutionalized and the experience broadened to include more potential players in complex humanitarian relief interventions.

Equally important, the individual groups represented at the symposium need to further their efforts toward understanding what their particular roles and missions might include in a humanitarian crisis and toward developing standardized task training to present to those most likely to need the information and practice. As might be expected, the military has taken the lead in this area, using a standard mission-analysis methodology and developing a task-conditions-standards training package for each mission requirement. Recognizing the need for uniformity of training for its international police candidates, the United Nations is developing a standardized training curriculum and materials that it hopes to share with donor countries as a means of assembling a force that has experienced some common core training.

Although both the U.S. government agency and NGO communities recognize the need for common and more efficient training, the lack of commitment in terms of organizational culture, as well as the lack of time and resources, limits their efforts. Hence, if the problem is the lack of better integrative processes, one suggested solution would be to have a department or agency of the U.S. government take the lead in developing core training requirements and assign responsibilities to various agencies and other participants that could then be trained at a common-use facility devoted to international training and response to complex emergencies. Doing this, however, would require significant resources, as well as a consensus among the agencies and the governments that support them.
On June 25–26, 2001, the United States Institute of Peace conducted its second annual symposium on the complex subject of best training practices for various aspects of conflict management. Whereas the first “Best Practices” symposium focused on training in skill sets, such as training mediators and negotiators, strategic nonviolence, conflict analysis, cross-cultural negotiation, training design, ethical responsibilities, and evaluation methods, this gathering focused on institutional training for the myriad agencies—governmental and nongovernmental alike—involving in humanitarian-relief and peace operations.

The program explored the training needs and practices of four distinct groups involved in peace operations—U.S. government agencies, the military, international civilian police (CivPol), and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)—that might be expected to respond, separately or collaboratively, to an emergency. Four panel discussions afforded the 100-plus attendees ample opportunity for a lively exchange of thoughts, learning experiences, and frustrations.

The keynote address for the symposium was delivered by Major General William Nash (U.S. Army, ret.), senior fellow and director of the Council on Foreign Relations’ Center for Preventive Action, who experienced firsthand, both as a military commander and as a civilian administrator, the challenges associated with forging a cohesive international response effort in Bosnia and Kosovo. Preferring to define this process in terms of the “postintervention development period,” Nash suggested that:

- Until the civilian components of the intervention attain the same level of competence and resources as the military, political objectives will not be achieved.
- Too much time is spent talking about the military effort and not enough about the political, social, and economic aspects of civilian training.
- If the civilian and military communities fail to train effectively, they will continue to experience pain in reaching their joint objectives.

Currently, he remarked, there is a stark contrast between the capabilities of the military and civilian communities at the beginning of operations. The military in general has abundant resources and a clear mission under unified control. This has not been the case with the civilian sector in peace operations, which is beset with multiple and conflicting agendas and generally enters the postintervention period lacking adequate resources, builds slowly, and spends an inordinate amount of time coordinating its own efforts rather than addressing the needs of the society in which it has intervened. That said, the success of these interventions still needs to be defined in civilian and not military terms. The military’s role is to “lead from behind,” acknowledging the primacy of the civilian goals and coordinating its support so that—to paraphrase Clausewitz—it becomes a continuation of the civilian effort by other means.
Nash further suggested that civilian success will likely be based on adapting international standards to the "new" political environment and gaining public acceptance, not re-establishing a failed system. There must, he posited, be development on all fronts: infrastructural, economic, human, and, particularly, leadership. Societies need leaders who can articulate, evaluate, and solve problems; yet there is no system in place to provide training in how to develop such leaders. In Nash's view, there must be a public debate on how the international community prepares its postintervention efforts. More to the point, though, there should also be a core training curriculum for all actors involved in humanitarian-relief and peace operations that is based on a common, holistic vision; such a curriculum would be built around enhanced human relations, interpersonal skills, communication, and management. Beyond this core training requirement, individual agencies and organizations must recruit and train people to be expert at what they do. At present, there is neither a centralized training facility nor a common curriculum to prepare civilians for the challenges they face in responding to international emergencies.

This report is divided into four parts, each corresponding to a symposium panel devoted to one of the policy communities involved in peace operations. Each part is further divided into three standard components: (1) a summary of the original paper or presentation; (2) an encapsulated discussion of the paper or presentation that includes remarks by selected commentators and a summary of the general audience discussion; and (3) comments by the author of this report on the substance of the presentation and the inter-relationships among the various topics.

The symposium's first panel focused on NGOs and how they approach training. Two presenters—Ian Smilie and Harvey Langholtz—provided papers and discussed the methodologies and challenges involved in NGO training and some steps that are being taken to resolve them. Barbara Wein, a program officer in the Training Program at the U.S. Institute of Peace, moderated the panel. Commenting on these presentations were Nancy Lindborg from Mercy Corps and Kimberly M. Maynard, former team leader in the U.S. Agency for International Development's (USAID) Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) and NGO field representative. The commentaries were followed by questions from the audience. This format was followed in all panel discussions.

The second panel discussion focused on U.S. government agencies and the training practices they employ to prepare their relevant employees to participate in peace and humanitarian-relief operations effectively. The sole presenter for this event was James Kunder from the Institute for Defense Analysis. Kunder's paper forthrightly presented his insights as a former director of OFDA. Ted Feifer, program officer in the U.S. Institute of Peace's Training Program, moderated the panel. Commentators included Richard McCall, consultant to USAID's administrator, and Tish Butler, director of USAID's Latin America and Caribbean bureau in the Office of Sustainable Regional Development.

The increasingly pivotal role played by international civilian police in the vital area of public security was the focus of the third panel. No longer an afterthought, international civilian police assistance is becoming better integrated into high-profile peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations. The two presenters for this panel were Tonya Cook, former adviser to UN police commissioners in Bosnia and East Timor, who discussed "Best Practices for Training Police for Humanitarian and Peace Operations"; and Graham Day,
former UN district administrator in East Timor and a senior fellow at the U.S. Institute of Peace, who narrated a slide presentation on the “Occupational Culture for International Police Officers: Implications for Training, Best Practices, and Policy.” Curtis Morris, program officer in the Training Program at the U.S. Institute of Peace, moderated the discussion. Commentators included former UN Civilian Police officer Clifford Aims; Robert Perito, deputy director of the Department of Justice’s International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP); and Eric Scheye of the UN Policy and Plans Division’s Civilian Police Unit.

The symposium’s final panel discussion focused on the increasingly expansive role that is being defined for military forces deployed to complex emergencies. In the broad spectrum of activity that lies between traditional peacekeeping and overt hostilities, military trainers are finding that they must add new skills training to their already heavy warfighting requirements. The sole presenter for this event was Lieutenant Colonel Brent Bankus from the U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute. Ray Caldwell, program officer in the Training Program at the U.S. Institute of Peace, moderated the panel. Commentators included Ambassador H. Allen Holmes, former assistant secretary of defense for special operations and low-intensity conflict and former assistant secretary of state for political-military affairs, and Colonel Tony Cucolo, commander of the Third Brigade Combat Team, Third U.S. Infantry Division.
Part I: Nongovernmental Organizations

One

Training to Learn: Institutional Obstacles and Technological Advances

According to Ian Smilie, in his paper “Learning: Abilities and Disabilities,” the learning culture within the NGO community tends to be ad hoc, personal, and experiential, and the idea of institutional learning within this culture is something of a fiction. While much of the work in institutional learning is done at the practitioner level, this research is frequently ignored at the organizational level—ironically—because it is not critical to the organization’s understanding of what it does or because it is not relevant to the situation on the ground. Consequently, any design for training must flow from learning needs of the entire organization and must be supported by a willingness and an ability to learn.

NGOs have certain training challenges that emerge from the manner in which they routinely “learn.” While the most logical method of learning may be formal, content-based training programs, such programs are, in fact, only a small part of the NGO world.

The formal training process for NGOs is handicapped by four challenges: (1) demand in the community is weak, as most NGOs are too busy “getting the job done” in a compartmentalized, get-it-done-now, donor-oriented project world; (2) because demand is weak, the supply of available training services is limited and tends to follow donor fads rather than addressing the needs of the client; (3) supply is also limited by the lack of available funds for training, as NGOs struggle to constrain their organizational overhead costs to maintain donor appeal; and (4) there is an innate hostility within the community toward evaluation, or at least toward the verification and control aspects of evaluation, that has limited NGOs’ interest in self-evaluation and, consequently, their ability to identify mistakes honestly and to learn from them.

These handicaps aside, NGOs do learn, often on the job, through cross-postings and seminars, budget workshops, and retreats. Learning takes place through the development of mission statements and strategies and through the evolution of organizational symbols, rituals, and stories that contribute to organizational culture. This “oral culture” is perceived to be as important as formal training. However, although oral cultures may be important in fostering organizational identity, operations involving multiple “identities”—that is, distinct institutional actors having to perform the tasks of other actors—often result in synergy that occurs mainly at the margins of the development and relief activities rather than at their centers.
Given the perilous nature of our times, however, and rapidly changing international circumstances, this training environment for NGOs is no longer good enough. For many of them, they should consider:

- Putting much greater effort and spending into research and self-evaluation.
- Investing in learning about how to engage the media in ways that advance an actual cause more than their immediate need for funds.
- Learning how to engage policymakers at levels that control budgets, mandates, and time frames.
- Creating meaningful incentives that make time available for NGO staff to learn, reflect, and synthesize their experiences, and to write down exactly what they are learning from those experiences.

As these points illustrate, a large part of NGO training needs to be directed at managing relationships— with governments, donors, the military, other NGOs, the media, and the public. Managing relationships has always been important to NGOs, but in recent years the issue of relationships has become more complex than ever before. Understanding the protagonists, contesting traditional boundaries, challenging rules and structures, developing new alliances, and surviving— while at the same time remaining true to core principles, objectives, and “identity”— undoubtedly represent the greatest NGO learning challenges in the years ahead.

In discussing the experiences of the United Nations Institute for Training and Research’s Program of Correspondence Instruction (POCI), Harvey Langholtz pointed out in the presentation of his paper, “Training for Humanitarian and Peace Operations Using Distance-Learning Methodology” that peace operations require many different types of training and that there are several different ways of providing such training. Humanitarian-relief operations are markedly different in the world of training, as are the job requirements and skill levels of humanitarian assistance workers.

In contrast to education, training is designed to prepare adults to perform a specific job. There are different types of job tasks— knowledge-based and skill-based. Knowledge-based tasks are cognitive and require understanding, dealing with abstract concepts, analysis, and decision making. Skill-based tasks are hands-on and require the operation of equipment or the achievement of some physical result. Many jobs require a combination of knowledge-based and skill-based tasks.

In providing instruction, trainers today must be cognizant of the technological advances that have increased training opportunities. In this regard, it is instructive to divide training into two categories: face-to-face and distance learning. In planning their approach to individual training sessions, professional trainers should understand the advantages and disadvantages inherent in both live classroom lecturing and prestructured distance training.

Live classroom training provides an opportunity for questions and for interaction between trainer and student, and in many cases between students and professional
colleagues they might not otherwise meet. One primary benefit of classroom-type training is that it permits the building of practitioner networks and the breaking down of cultural and organizational barriers. The disadvantages include travel distances, costs, limited capacity, and students’ inability to depart from the pace or direction of the rest of the group. Classroom instruction is preferred when it is important that a small group of students have face-to-face interaction with the teacher and with each other, when the purpose is not only to teach established concepts but to develop new ideas or solutions, when updates are frequent, and when there is space or funding available to support the expenses of a classroom course. This form of instruction is also preferred when hands-on skills are being taught, so that practice can take place under the direct supervision of the teacher/trainer.

Distance learning, on the other hand, has the advantage of being able to be delivered to students in situ with no need for travel, housing, meals, or classroom space. The cost per student is low and there is more flexibility in pacing the training to meet particular students' special needs. However, distance learning limits student-teacher interaction and the exchange of views among students and provides less ability to tailor the course of instruction along the way to meet the emerging needs of the participants. Distance learning is preferred when (1) there is an existing and agreed-upon body of knowledge to be presented, (2) there is a large population of geographically dispersed students to teach, (3) the content of the material remains fairly constant over time, (4) the material must be presented in a standardized format under centralized control (that is, with no need to account for regional/local conditions or circumstances), and (5) there is less need for a classroom instructor to guide the discussion.

These approaches to training can be creatively integrated, and many programs have both a classroom and a distance-learning component. The United Nations Institute for Training and Research’s POCI approach to distance learning stemmed from the changing role of the United Nations in peacekeeping and humanitarian intervention. The “second-generation” peacekeeping efforts that emerged after the end of the Cold War involve new challenges beyond established standards and experience, with many countries providing troops and NGO representatives. Hence, training for such an expanded repertoire of tasks must be cohesive and organized, on the one hand, to provide easy access to common universal approaches and, on the other hand, to preserve the prerogative of sovereign contributing nations to train their personnel as they see fit.

The United Nations responded in two ways. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) established its own training unit (recently named the Training and Evaluation Service, or TES), with the responsibility to coordinate and standardize training among member states that contribute to peacekeeping operations.

The UN Institute for Training and Research’s POCI and TES have developed the comprehensive Cooperative Training Program—combining classroom training, correspondence courses, and individual student research—the completion of which leads to a certificate of training in United Nations peace support operations.*

After some discussion of one of POCI’s self-paced training courses, “The Conduct of Humanitarian Relief Operations,” Langholtz concluded that if humanitarian relief organi-

* For more on their role and functions, see http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/training. In addition, the UN Institute for Training and Research’s POCI, which is responsible for distance learning, has a list of available training courses at http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/training/list1.htm.
zations are to stretch their limited funding and achieve their goals of serving at-risk populations in the field, the questions of efficiency and economy of training become critical. The proper application of distance learning can provide a very economical alternative for an NGO that needs to train a geographically distributed workforce quickly, using a set of standard approaches to job performance.

Discussion

Nancy Lindborg noted that both presenters underscored the different operating environment in second-generation peacekeeping operations: Now, NGOs are more likely to be directly involved in conflict in carrying out their organizational missions. Working side by side with the military has created different, and sometimes difficult, challenges for the NGO community. In this environment, training is not a complement but an absolute requirement to increase NGO effectiveness. Humanitarian organizations tend to attract idealists, so the task is to train them to perform their jobs more effectively while maintaining that idealism.

Because operating environments have been dangerous of late, NGO-sponsored training has focused on security enhancement and problem solving. In decentralized organizations, it is difficult to move people around; consequently, the prospect of distance learning appeals to NGOs.

Kimberly Maynard commented that both papers correctly highlighted the limitations NGOs face in organizing training. While there may be a lack of a learning culture among NGOs, there is no lack of interest or will. This learning culture lacuna is based on certain conditions and factors, which include:

- The difficulty of finding appropriate people with appropriate skills.
- Rapid operational tempo and scarce funding, which leave little time for assembling and integrating personnel before the mission for briefings and debriefings.
- The unwillingness of donors to spend time and money on training.
- The NGO community’s aversion to evaluation and research.
- NGOs’ reliance on external funding, which presents unique challenges.
- The example of policymakers, who come from government organizations that usually lack the requisite learning culture.
- The lack of appropriate courses, particularly those related to job performance skills.

Military organizations typically have better funding, resources, and training opportunities. However, many NGOs limit their association with the military to avoid being perceived as intelligence gatherers and to maintain an image of independence and neutrality. The relationship could be closer if a clear distinction—in substance and appearance—were drawn between military operations and humanitarian operations.

What will it take to raise the professional level of the NGO community? The most critical need is for training that is broad, follows a step-by-step approach, and is focused on job performance. What is needed most, though, is a list of NGOs’ most pressing require-
ments, such as more efficient management, fostering developmental relief, setting up operations, establishing relationships with local aid recipients, and forming exit strategies. The NGO community also needs to engage the media, legislators, the public, and organizational donors to gain understanding and consensus on the need for and permissibility of allocating a portion of funding to field training and staff development. Finally, NGOs must create a capacity within the community for better learning, which includes fostering better relationships between research and field organizations and exploring the opportunities afforded by distance learning.

One participant noted that there are many existing training opportunities for NGO staff to interact with the military. In the recent past, it has been the military that has reached out to the NGO community. However, the high turnover rate in both the military and the NGO community suggests that ongoing training interaction is essential for continued future success. Evidence suggests that turnover rates decline in NGOs that are equipped with training programs.

Another participant suggested strengthening the relationship between the academic and practitioner communities. Aside from the UN’s initiatives, some universities are currently engaged in or are developing relevant training curricula. These include:

- Tufts University’s Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, which offers a master’s degree program and a course for professionals (“Humanitarianism and War”).
- Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government, which offers executive programs in civil-military cooperation.
- George Mason University, which offers a master’s degree program in peace operations.

While these offerings suggest a growing commitment on the part of the academic community, it is difficult for the typical NGO to participate with regard to both time and money. Donors tend to evaluate NGO performance largely by cost factors, rating an organization as “good” if little of its funding is devoted to overhead, including training and professionalization programs. Until this perception changes, it will be difficult for underfunded organizations to devote the necessary time and money from the limited stream of donations they receive.

**Comment**

NGOs are as diverse as the societies that foster and sustain them. Until recently, their focus has been largely vertical, concerned with their unique organizational structures, funding and recruiting sources, and cultures and missions. At the same time, they have sustained their relationships with the governments and populations in the regions they support. Because of the increasing complexity of humanitarian operations, most NGOs now recognize the need to build horizontal relationships to improve their own effectiveness in an increasingly crowded and confused humanitarian aid and development environment. Building relationships and increasing effectiveness are areas in which training would yield significant benefits, yet there are formidable hurdles to overcome in increasing the right kinds of training.
As pointed out in the papers and in the general discussion, relationship building with donors and the media must, more than ever, include an educational dimension, and such a crucial addition requires an increasing awareness that NGO organizational efficiency and effectiveness would improve if more training—particularly joint training—could be funded from the contribution base. Given the historic competition among NGOs for funding and increasing, media-reinforced skepticism regarding the effectiveness and charitable intent of some NGOs, it will take a collaborative effort among the leading NGOs and institutional donors to ensure that this message is widely received and understood. Without the ability to apportion more of their funds to training, however, NGOs will continue to face increasingly difficult tasks with the same level of training.

NGOs and the governmental agencies that support them share an aversion to content-based training. This aversion can be explained and rationalized in part by the idealism, zeal, and operating tempo of most humanitarian agencies. A certain esprit de corps infuses these types of NGOs as part of a network of organizations whose repertoires are based largely on experience and shaped by dedicated, visionary leaders—a model that can never be replicated in a classroom setting or by distance learning of rote skills. The mystique of selfless commitment, reinforced by an oral tradition of hardship, ingenuity, determination, and ultimate success, has a role to play in recruiting and retaining workers for the typical NGO devoted to humanitarian relief projects. However, analyzing and institutionalizing that experience, and spreading the salient information across a broader segment of an organization, is also important if the organization is to improve and grow.

The NGO community’s inherent dislike of evaluation exacerbates its aversion to training. After all, if the organization is doing “good work,” shouldn’t that be enough? The easy answer is yes; but with donors increasingly wanting to quantify the results of their contributions, making the argument for increased allocation of resources to personnel training may be difficult. Yet increasing skills in areas such as requirement analysis, mission planning, relationship building, negotiation and mediation, and report writing could be critical to conducting the mission satisfactorily. Also, these skills are essential to satisfactorily responding to donor inquiries and to making the case for continued or expanded project funding.

Effectiveness at the other end of the aid delivery process—in the “host” country that is experiencing the complex emergency—is just as dependent on building relationships with numerous agencies. Coordinating efforts and resources, and applying the right solutions to clearly identified problems, facilitates everyone’s efforts in the peace operation. Learning to operate effectively in this environment should not solely be the result of on-the-job training, if at all possible. Training between missions with the personnel one is likely to work with is one of the best ways to build relationships in advance and to begin the process of understanding relative strengths and weaknesses. As the discussion pointed out, there are now many venues for conducting this training, both locally based and structured for distance learning. Only organizational will and funding are required to increase their use. Based on the evaluation of mission and organizational strengths and weaknesses, adjustments to meet the needs can be recommended.
The armed forces are training-based organizations that routinely schedule joint training events for their members. In recent years, the armed forces have increasingly reached out to the civilian government and NGO communities for their participation in common training for peace operations. Until a dedicated interagency training facility is established, it would be economical and beneficial for NGOs and government personnel to accept these invitations and join with the military in exercises and other training events.
The United States government has little ability today to respond rapidly to an international humanitarian emergency with a well-trained disaster response team. The delivery of adequate training to U.S. government personnel for the management of complex emergencies is hampered by three distinct shortcomings: inadequate training content, inadequate training coverage, and the absence of a single command center with the responsibility for improving training in complex-emergency management. U.S. government personnel do not receive targeted training in many of the critical skills required to plan for or manage an international humanitarian crisis, let alone one that involves mass violence. Our understanding of complex emergencies has advanced sufficiently to the point where we should be able to identify specific skill sets that are needed. For key U.S. government personnel, these include skills required to:

- Assemble a regional coalition or “coalition of the willing” to supply peacekeeping forces.
- Locate funding for complex-emergency responses from pre-existing U.S. government sources.
- Assess the level and duration of humanitarian aid needed.
- Draft a political-military plan for relevant U.S. government agencies.
- Negotiate access for the delivery of humanitarian relief supplies in the host country.
- Conduct liaison with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees.
- Organize separation and demobilization of the parties in conflict pursuant to a peace agreement.
- Rebuild the criminal justice system or provide human rights monitoring once peacekeeping forces have been deployed.

However, the level of U.S. government resources currently allocated to training for complex emergencies suggests that senior decision makers do not share the assumption that such special skills and capabilities are required. These types of requirements are frequently deemed by senior government and military leaders to be “lesser included skills”
that any competent Foreign Service or military officer should be able to manage. Indeed, setting expectations at this high level assumes that something inherent in the individuals or their normal work environment would have prepared them to understand and operate effectively in the miasma of competing influences that constitute a complex emergency. Yet such is not the case.

**Defining the Content**

While some good training is available, many, if not most, civilian U.S. government employees participating in interagency meetings to manage and resolve complex emergencies abroad will have never taken a single course related specifically to such crises. Limited training resources and the slow restructuring of existing training programs to fit the complex-emergency environment force them to fall back on their general knowledge in these situations.

In attempting to make the available training more relevant, the principal issue that must be resolved is what to teach. No systematic, authoritative process has ever been undertaken to examine what skills are required of officers at the National Security Council (NSC), the Department of State, USAID, and other responding departments and agencies, at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. A matrix with required skills on the vertical axis and responding agencies on the horizontal axis would be a good tool for determining the existing level of knowledge and the areas where additional training would be needed. Developing such a matrix would require interagency consensus based on a shared template of skills required; to attempt training without such an analysis would produce hit-or-miss results.

The way forward to systemized training content consists of several intermediate steps:

- Development of an authoritative process template, most likely by the NSC, delineating the key steps that U.S. government officials consider during a complex emergency. Such a process template must consider the range of activities, from the NSC deputies’ meetings to field-level coordination at the crisis area.
- Determination of the skill sets required of U.S. government officers in order to implement those key process steps.
- Determination of priority skill sets and training requirements.
- Development of focused training courses and incorporation of information from those courses into existing or newly developed courses.
- Assignment of responsibility for training among responsible U.S. government agencies.

This approach is similar to that taken by the military in developing its joint training system with Joint Mission Essential Task Lists. Also, the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s Federal Response Plan provides a clearly delineated interagency template for the steps to be followed in a major U.S. disaster. These formats provide a good starting point for the type of government-wide analysis that is needed to develop the requirements for U.S. government response to international humanitarian crises and complex emergencies.
**The Problem of Coverage**

Fielding a well-trained U.S. government team implies not only having appropriate training content available but also delivering that training to the right U.S. government officers. While there is much discussion today regarding information dissemination techniques in training, the more fundamental issue is how training coverage can be targeted to align the limited training resources available with the wide array of skilled individuals required in complex emergency environments and the large number of U.S. government officers who are likely to participate in a response. Experience has shown that the cast of characters the U.S. government assembles to deal with a crisis varies substantially with the particular region, the nature of the emergency, and the phase of the operation. Add to this the fact that many government officers, at any particular time, will have spent a relatively short period of time in their positions or may leave them in a few years and it is easy to see the training challenge that exists.

Apparently, the current consensus on an interagency approach is to do more of everything—more training per Presidential Decision Directive (PDD)-56,* more courses at the State Department’s Foreign Service Institute and the U.S. Institute of Peace, more multiagency exercises, and a wider distribution of interactive training to harness technology to the training task. But spreading more training across more people may not be the best solution. The more plausible alternative is investing the limited U.S. government training resources in concentrated, targeted, in-depth training for a smaller cadre of key officers, accompanied by structural changes in the way that international crises are managed. In this regard, it makes more sense to develop and fully train two key components of an improved governmental response to complex emergencies: (1) standing interagency planning and implementation staffs for managing complex emergencies, and (2) a cadre of standby crisis managers prepared to serve as interagency coordinators for crisis response.

There are several existing models upon which these components could be built: (1) the Joint Interagency Task Force on international narcotics operations; (2) the several Deployable Joint Task Force Augmentation Cells created by the U.S. military to support emergency operations; and (3) the Washington-based Response Management Team established by OFDA. All of these teams contain highly qualified, well-trained individuals who serve as the core cadre that could hold together an augmented crisis-response capability.

While broad-based training may be useful to familiarize as many U.S. government officers as possible with the unique elements and vagaries of the crisis response environment, such training runs the risk of becoming a diffuse program that is “a mile wide and an inch deep.”

**The Absence of a Center for Training**

The careful analysis of, and improvement in, training content and training coverage requires the creation of a dedicated institution that has a specific responsibility for enhanced government training for complex emergencies. At present, there is no clear “ownership” of the training mission; as a result, the U.S. government’s disaster response process is characterized by “informality, absence of formal doctrine, uncertain leadership or direction, lack of serious contingency planning, and unclear reporting relationships.”

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* Established in 1997, PDD-56 was the Clinton administration’s policy for managing complex-emergency operations.
There are at least two potential candidates to fill this need in the near term. One is the War Gaming and Simulation Center at the National Defense University, which has announced its intent to create an Interagency Education, Training, and After-Action Review Program that will provide the interagency community with a focal point for innovation in education, research, and simulation exercises. Another potential candidate is the State Department's Foreign Service Institute.

Whether one of these or an entirely different structure is adopted, the immediate issues that should be addressed include:

- How can U.S. government civilian training for complex emergencies be integrated into U.S. military training and exercises?
- How can training for complex emergencies be incorporated into regularly scheduled training and orientation programs, such as those for incoming Foreign Service officers at the State Department and USAID?
- What types of certificate programs should be created or enhanced to promote professionalization of crisis managers?
- How can the personnel systems of key U.S. government agencies accommodate and reward training in the management of complex emergencies?

Given the challenges ahead, “more of the same” is not the best solution to the U.S. government’s training shortfalls. Existing constraints in both training funds and time available require a careful examination of training content and coverage, with an eye to substantial improvement.

**Discussion**

Richard McCall agreed that the federal government needs to get its house in order and to focus on the longer timeline. Bureaucracies tend to focus on their own “piece of the action” and gear training toward their own response requirements, but they often fail at interagency coordination. Postconflict intervention must address the cause of the conflict, and training for such intervention must incorporate the complexities and contingencies of different cultures caught up in complex emergencies. To be effective, training for this uncertain environment must be multidisciplinary and should be directed toward interagency teams.

Tish Butler noted that, despite the apparent need for interagency responses to the increasing complexity of international emergencies, the State Department has chosen to respond by confining training development to its own organizational experiences. While it recognizes the need for improved and expanded interagency training, it prefers to rely on existing training structures, creating interagency organizations only when internal structures are overwhelmed. While training should be improved and expanded, the primary skill sets needed for response to complex emergencies are already built into State Department officials’ basic managerial toolbox. Rather than create a central group of responders, the preferred alternative from Butler’s point of view would be to design a program that enables more regional players to respond more effectively.
Commentary from the audience was lively. There was some feeling that PDD-56 is essentially flawed because it assumes that once there is a crisis, the government will be able to produce the needed numbers of highly qualified responders immediately. There was general agreement that the complex-emergency environment does indeed require a specialized set of skills, and that everybody cannot be trained in everything. An interagency effort at determining the most critical skills would be welcomed. Once an assessment is made of critical tasks and requirements, it is possible to tailor general training programs appropriately.

There was also lively discussion among the attendees regarding the perceived bias of the State Department and similar organizations against training. While NGOs share a bias toward hands-on, experiential training, they recognize that there needs to be more. Yet the State Department remains attached to experiential training as being the most conducive to its needs and better suited to the environment in which it operates.

Of particular note were the comments of Len Hawley, a former deputy assistant secretary of state, who reinforced the point that mission success in complex-emergency operations requires regular and effective coordination among civilian agencies and military units in the area of operations. No one agency can achieve mission success alone, he suggested, and progress in one area depends on progress made in another. Although he felt that there had been considerable progress in effective civilian-military coordination over the past decade in working together in Haiti, Bosnia, Honduras, and Kosovo, each new crisis presents yet more demanding challenges, outstripping current capacity in this important dimension of peace operations.

What Hawley found troubling was that complex emergencies looming on the horizon are likely to present increasing difficulties for civilian-military coordination of operations on the ground. The trend in complex emergencies indicates ever more difficult and hostile operating environments, more harm being done to civilians, more damage to all aspects of civil society, and greater requirements for the international community to respond in a comprehensive and assertive manner. In addition, commitments are expected to be longer, ranging from three to ten years.

Hawley argued for a bold, comprehensive fix to this debilitating situation. Half-hearted, incremental efforts by some agencies will not address the pervasive, multiagency, multilevel challenge. A new approach is needed, one that accounts for the realities on the ground in achieving the necessary unity of effort among civilian and military organizations to achieve mission success.

The thrust of this new, realistic approach would focus attention on the weakest link in civilian-military coordination in a peace operation—genuine cooperation. Such cooperation will come, he argued, only when both communities share dependable and realistic expectations of each other in successful facilitation of the peace process, both act in concert to address common challenges using common operational guidelines, and both train together in a realistic environment to face challenges on the “battlefield” of the twenty-first century using state-of-the-art training tools.
With regard to realistic expectations, the military should expect civilian NGOs to:

- Protect their operational independence. NGOs normally do not accept any obligations other than those of their supporters.
- Adopt a neutral posture among the parties to the conflict, thereby securing a degree of protection in a “white hat” mode.
- Operate in dangerous areas assisting innocent civilians at risk.
- Possess limited capabilities compared to the military—security, transportation, communication, and so forth.
- Deploy early and stay longer than the military—these are not short-term missions for civilian organizations.

Similarly, NGOs should expect the military to:

- Act under the direction of governments that exercise strong control over their armed forces’ operations.
- Stabilize the security situation within their limited capabilities.
- Protect their own personnel first, then those of the host country’s civilian organizations.
- Avoid overcommitments, because the military’s rules of engagement will not allow it to go too far.
- Terminate its operations and depart when the security situation appears stable.

Hawley concluded his remarks by stating that genuine cooperation between civilian and military organizations cannot be left to chance. Such cooperation will come to pass only when all officials share dependable expectations and act in concert using common operational guidelines. This, he believed, would happen only when both sides are able to train together before combining their efforts on a shared field of operations.

**Comment**

Jim Kunder’s approach to training envisions an interagency analysis of tasks required to be performed, development of training content, and application of performance training to a select group that would serve as a standing core capability around which a greater response could be built. The military has taken this approach and has proved its effectiveness in numerous joint and combined operations and exercises. If adopted, this approach would require the creation of a centralized training management institution that would be responsible for developing and continually updating training content. Alternatively, the training itself could be implemented through existing institutions, such as the Foreign Service Institute, the National Defense University, and the U.S. Institute of Peace.

But what about the value of experience and the need to provide training to broader segments of the supporting agencies? Enhancing existing agency capabilities and training practices with a centralized coordinating structure and a number of response teams that could facilitate operations in the field would appear to solve a great many needs without
sacrificing organizational culture. Broad-based awareness training could be developed and incorporated into regular agency training practices for the rank-and-file, freeing selected individuals to focus on the intricacies of a coordinated response.

Overcoming institutional concerns in this area is a significant challenge and should be undertaken only with a broad consensus. Yet, in light of the events of September 11, 2001, gaining that consensus may be easier today than at any time in the past.
International civilian police are recruited from member states of the United Nations, or from other multilateral organizations, by the United Nations Civilian Police (UNCivPol) mechanism managed by the Civilian Police Division of the UN’s Department of Peacekeeping Operations. The recruitment and training of international civilian police is now a worldwide undertaking, with seventy nations currently participating in UN operations.

Largely unknown before the 1990s, UNCivPol are now an integral part of the UN’s largest peacekeeping operations, receiving their mandates from UN Security Council resolutions. These mandates may authorize UNCivPol to do one or more of the following:

- Monitor and report on the performance of local police officers.
- Mentor and train local police forces.
- Establish, reform, or restructure local police agencies.
- Investigate abuses perpetrated by local police.
- In some cases, carry out a transitional police administration, sometimes with executive authority—that is, equipped with firearms and full powers of arrest (as in Kosovo and East Timor).

Although it may seem obvious that different mandates bring with them different training needs, current UNCivPol training programs do not properly address this requirement. The report of the UN Secretary General’s Panel on UN Peace Operations (the Brahimi Report) identified the need to improve the assessment and training of personnel deployed to peace operations. However, despite UNCivPol’s increasingly important role, the preparation and training of police contingents by contributing countries is not adequate. Consequently, there are no best practices for training international civilian police for the comprehensive postconflict public security and peacebuilding role envisioned for them.

The international community is not well organized for the deployment of specialists in training and developing new or reformed police forces. Rather, UNCivPol are recruited mainly for monitoring and reporting tasks in accordance with the “SMART” concept—that is, limiting their activities to Supporting, Monitoring, Advising, Reporting, and Training. Yet a police monitoring mission is appropriate only where a local, functioning
police force exists. In today’s complex emergencies, monitoring is usually eclipsed by other activities. Peacekeeping is now less about monitoring than about reform, organizational change, institution building or strengthening, and overall capacity building in the public security sector. Police need new skills to meet this challenge, involving the development of relevant organizations and, especially, their human resources components; the strengthening of managerial systems; and the changing of institutional norms.

Where training is given, it is too simplistic and not sufficiently differentiated to reflect the variety of tasks international civilian police will perform; it may fail to provide them with agreed-upon ethics and standards to guide their professional activities or to explain how their actions may negatively or positively affect the society in which they are working. High levels of uncertainty characterize postconflict environments, and training must help international civilian police to cope with and successfully navigate such social turbulence.

Three types of training for international civilian police currently exist: (1) premission or predeployment training, which UN member states contributing officers conduct according to their own national standards to prepare their officers; (2) in-mission or induction training that is delivered by the UN, for example, after officers arrive in a peace operation to prepare them for deployment in the mission area; and (3) specialized in-service training, which is currently underdeveloped.

Although training is a national responsibility, DPKO’s Military Division and TES and the UN Civilian Police Division (CPD) are charged with supporting the assessment and training of military and police components for UN peace operations. Their emphasis, however, has been on adapting military support to meet police needs, rather than on developing an independent police assessment and training capability. As many nations do not afford their police even basic peacekeeping training, the sooner the CPD can take responsibility for establishing its own training and assessment policies and content, the sooner it can develop a baseline from what is being taught and begin the process of formulating a common training curriculum for all contributing states.

Currently, the CPD has limited capability: It has conducted only four “train-the-trainer” courses and is providing some Selection Assistance Teams to evaluate English and driving skills. In August 2000, it distributed revised standards for assessment and training of police officers to the contributing states, and it is developing new training courses and packages of training materials; a draft United Nations Police Officer’s Course was finalized in April 2001, but until this draft is approved and published, induction training will continue to follow the outdated predeployment models.

Predeployment training in the United States for American officers being prepared for peace operations is the responsibility of the State Department’s Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. The bureau has contracted the requirement for recruiting and training experienced police officers to DynCorp Technical Services, thereby addressing the lack of a national police force. DynCorp’s nine-day predeployment training program focuses on screening and personal skills testing, with some attention devoted to mission-specific training. The United States Institute of Peace provides two days of training on mission-specific conflict analysis and management, problem solving, cross-cultural communication, operational awareness, ethical concerns, and coping strategies. The State Department provides limited human rights training and mission overviews.
The Canadian government, in collaboration with its Lester B. Pearson International Peacekeeping Center, has a broader program of predeployment training that includes exposure to comparative police systems and international law. It also stresses the ancillary role that police play in elections, development, disarmament, reintegration, and other areas. Similar courses are offered in the Nordic countries, which place special emphasis on codes of conduct, ethical issues, and multicultural awareness, but which also continue to focus on the SMART concept discussed previously.

There is the promise of a more coordinated future in predeployment training. In accordance with the recommendations of the Brahimi Report regarding civilian police, the CPD is following a two-year work plan designed to “strengthen the activities of the CPD and the CivPol components in the field....” The work plan covers six categories: (1) the development, publication, and distribution of UN Civilian Police Principles and Guidelines; (2) the creation of a civilian police rapid deployment capability; (3) the improvement of the CPD’s capacity to inform and support the development of local police institutions; (4) the improvement of information management systems; (5) a greater understanding of the relationship between law enforcement and the judiciary, and the ability to pursue a more integrated approach to public security; and (6) the increased professional development of UN Civilian Police. As of April 2002, the UN Civilian Police Principles and Guidelines are still in draft and, once the training materials have been revised to reflect them, they will be released.

The responsibility for induction training generally falls to the police components in missions, though the CPD now recognizes that it has a responsibility to participate in the standardization of this training. The responsibility for police induction training in the UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, for example, fell to the International Police Task Force (IPTF), which established a screening and training program that evaluated English language capability and driving skills and taught a week-long program that included courses in standard mission instructions, the IPTF mandate, democratic and community policing, history of the region and the conflict, international organizations in Bosnia, human rights and noncompliance, and other IPTF-specific procedures. There was further emphasis on computer skills, communications, mediation/negotiation, local language, report writing, security awareness, and operating UN equipment. Some support to the process was provided by the U.S. Department of Justice’s International Criminal Investigative Training and Assistance Program (ICITAP), which has also been active in supporting missions in Kosovo and East Timor.

Keeping in mind the very real dilemmas posed when trying to train police officers of different cultures with different experiences and skill levels from seventy countries, areas for training improvement should include:

- Mandate, motivation, and the need for goal-oriented training. International civilian police training should clearly reflect (1) what CivPol are mandated to do and the overall strategy for achieving mission objectives, (2) what experience shows they will be asked to do, and (3) a realistic understanding of the complex environment in which they will operate.

- Setting expectations for performance. Setting and communicating appropriate expectations for performance are key to successful training and overall professional development and should orient officers to think creatively.
Setting expectations for behavior. Maintaining CivPol legitimacy depends on the ethics and overall character of the individuals sent. UN CivPol need to be trained to assume responsibility for respecting the ethos of the rule of law and for generating it.

Essential enabling skills. In addition to language and driving skills, predeployment training should focus on the use of communications and computer equipment; radio procedures; map reading; first aid; basic safety measures and precautions; report writing; negotiation, mediation, and conflict resolution skills; and information-gathering versus intelligence-gathering skills.

Imparting necessary knowledge. Included in the knowledge necessary for the success of civilian police missions in peace operations are the following:

- The fundamental concepts of human rights.
- The norms of international democratic policing.
- The concept and practice(s) of community-oriented policing.
- Effecting police reform, including an overview of police culture and changing police organizations.
- A review of the instruments that guide the work of international civilian police.
- The proper use of force.
- The organization and structure of the peace operation, including the roles of the various components; the organizational and command structure of the CivPol component; the necessity for unity of effort and command; and an introduction to the work being done by UN agencies, NGOs, and other international organizations in the area of operations.
- The principles of UN CivPol components in peacekeeping.
- The key operational activities of monitoring, training, reforming, restructuring, mentoring, investigating, or exercising executive authority.
- The local legal context and the status of the rule of law and local police forces.
- The political context within which objectives must be achieved, including the historical and social context, as well as the country’s language and geography.
- Any ongoing disarmament and demobilization (particularly mine awareness measures), reintegration, and humanitarian assistance efforts.
- Assistance in providing security for elections.

In summary, the experience of the past ten years must be recognized and incorporated into the training regimen for the interventions that lie ahead. The recommendations of the Brahimi Report and PDD-71, which deal with strengthening criminal justice systems in support of peace operations, must be brought to fruition if we are to standardize training—particularly induction training—for civilian police. CivPol officers must be more accountable for their actions, and common disciplinary guidelines must be distributed and enforced.
Graham Day suggested that the greatest challenge for the next century will be maintaining and restoring law and order in postconflict situations. And integrating CivPol contingents from different countries—with different cultural attributes that shape their members’ professional and ethical codes in the common endeavor of law enforcement—will be the greatest challenge in the public security component of future peace operations.

For example, there are four basic ideal types of police culture: democratic, authoritarian, communitarian, and traditional. (In a communitarian culture, for instance, communal values are the paramount authority and society may enforce compliance with the group.) Also, international civilian police emerge from several different bodies of law: common law, civil law, laws based on customs or traditions, and Confucian and Shari’a laws, to name just a few. The multiple combinations that are possible among authority types and bodies of law highlight the fact that some form of common CivPol training would be advantageous and that flexibility in design and application is important.

Police have their own occupational culture and are generally guided by an inner ethical compass that swings between right and wrong and is reinforced by their innate sense of justice. They place high value on personal and technical preparedness and on their ability to use their personal weapons. With regard to institutional values, their faith is placed in their partners, the command hierarchy, and, to some extent, the public. This value hierarchy is important in an environment in which they are attempting to apply the principles of democratic and community policing and to react in accordance with international human rights standards.

Turning away from the generic police model toward the current organizational culture of international civilian police, we find it to be fragmented and almost incoherent. The ethics of the organizational culture appear to be based on international human rights principles, but there are numerous and important exceptions. There is no uniformly accepted code of conduct, and there is certainly no effective internal disciplinary code. The way that CivPol efforts are being conducted right now is suboptimal.

Compounding the situation is the culture of the host country’s police, those local officers either retained or recruited in the postemergency period. This group has its own specific basis of authority, code of law, and personal motivations, and these do not readily match those of the international civilian police who have come to the country. Local police generally will have gone through a period of postconflict trauma and may not be sure what the existing structures are or how well they will hold up. As the existing “face of the state,” they generally feel the trauma more than any other institution.

How to remedy this situation? One necessary step is to broaden the exposure of national police forces to different cultures and approaches to police work. Another positive step would be to replace national symbols and equipment that different CivPol contin-
gents bring to the mission with common UN uniforms and equipment, and to provide these items and the necessary training to use them, before deployment. More time during the induction training process should be spent on team building and on developing a homogeneous force. Finally, the international CivPol force should be culturally acclimatized to the host country’s police forces and should be fully co-deployed with them.

Discussion

Clifford Aims acknowledged that there was a lot to be done in the training of civilian police, and that PDD-71 acknowledges this. The United States has some 700,000 police officers in a variety of jurisdictions, usually with a sharply limited focus; the nation’s 8,000-plus law enforcement organizations have widely different organizational mindsets, and the “policing” of America is very decentralized.

The international CivPol environment is very different from the ones familiar to police officers in the United States. Infrastructure and communications capabilities are less developed; forces are thin and spread out, requiring more autonomy of action. The State Department is bringing on a full-time training coordinator to better prepare police personnel for these challenges and to convince local police chiefs that CivPol skills can be helpful in domestic settings.

Erik Scheye noted that it was easy to criticize the United Nations regarding training, but that it should be remembered that the organization does not recruit police officers. It takes what member states provide and is politically unable to tell states that their police are inadequate.

Every CivPol operation must develop plans for its own eventual withdrawal and therefore must deal with the local police and bring them up to an acceptable standard. But what are the standards to be applied? Outside of basic UN human rights standards, there are no existing universal standards for police, and determining what local police forces should look like must take into account local culture, traditions, and the legal and political infrastructures. Thus, the ideals of democratic and community policing, while conceptually valid, may vary in their application to suit local conditions.

CivPol recruits need extensive training in the local culture that they will be supporting, including the local police culture. They need to know how to communicate effectively with local civilians against the backdrop of their history, culture, and communications style. More important, police need clear goals and direction as to what they are expected to accomplish.

ICITAP’s Robert Perito acknowledged that, while his agency has a role in training indigenous police forces, its primary focus is on public security and the establishment of an effective justice system, without which other nation-building activities are hampered. Peacekeepers need to arrive in the area of operations with a “law and order kit,” and priority must be given to the rule of law. The United Nations lacks the funds for relevant training, but it could provide the mechanism for countries to collaborate on solving their law enforcement training problems, assuming the political will to do so is found.

Further discussion from the floor revolved around the issue of a standby CivPol force (a “Blue Force”) that could be rapidly deployed to fill a public security void. It was noted that the European Union is moving toward establishing a 5,000-person constabulary.
force, 1,200 members of which could move within 30 days to act as a transition force, to be replaced by UN CivPol. A similar organization in the form of a “Corps of the Americas” (composed of police detachments from Canada, Mexico, and the United States) was proposed, but many participants did not believe the political will existed for such a step. Selection and training of CivPol will likely remain the responsibility of each nation separately. Yet in the case of the United States, for example, it might be more practicable for a federal government agency to identify and train an experienced cadre of police officers across the country and call them up individually, as needed, for service in peace operations.

It was also pointed out that police forces cannot be assembled outside the consideration of family relationships and the establishment of family support mechanisms that will allow the CivPol officers to concentrate on the mission at hand. The Canadians have used commercial contractors to set up family support centers, and family support teams are common in military deployments. This practice needs to be replicated in the CivPol context.

**Comment**

If there is one development that stands out among the many that have emerged from the recent series of international humanitarian interventions, it is the realization that public security is absolutely critical to the successful execution of humanitarian relief and development efforts. Without public security, social order breaks down further, relief supplies are pilfered, more segments of society are free to inflict vengeance upon one another for historic and perceived wrongs, and the entire process of reconciliation and reconstruction is slowed, if not frozen. In response, the international community has deployed its own civilian police to fill temporary security voids or, if need be, restore and mentor local police forces.

International civilian police are deployed under the auspices and with the authority of the United Nations, which also defines their mandate and, to a limited extent, provides them with equipment and training. In reality, there has been little in the way of common training given to this diverse group of law enforcement officers. They have been “donated” from some seventy-plus countries, and they come to the task with widely divergent levels of skill and experience. As one might expect, their ability to assemble and work effectively together under adverse circumstances is severely constrained. It is a tribute to the personnel selected and deployed that they have been able to achieve the positive results recorded to date.

The authors and discussants correctly identified the three phases of CivPol training: predeployment, induction, and specialized. The responsibility of the United Nations with regard to the first two phases is to develop, validate, field, and monitor a common training curriculum that can be used both by nations contributing police officers for peace operations and by the in-country CivPol leadership for both predeployment and induction training. The curriculum should be based on an analysis of the skills necessary for the mandated mission and should stress the importance of team-building procedures and cross-cultural communication, not only with the host population and police but within the CivPol structure as well.
Predeployment training should focus on individual preparation and equipment, as it does now, but it should be expanded to begin the process of transition from national to international police. It should devote more time to setting expectations for individual and group behavior and imparting a better understanding of the mandate, the operational environment, and the in-country support structure. Family care issues must be taken care of before departure; in the United States in particular, some thought should be given to establishing a centralized support and information clearinghouse for families to turn to in case of emergency.

Induction training should continue the transition process, focusing extensively on local conditions, local police procedures, team building, other agencies and organizations operating in the area, and local expectations with regard to police performance and behavior. All CivPol in a given region should be similarly uniformed and equipped. They should be absolutely clear on their overall mission and support structure, their local objectives, and their role in the overall scheme of the international community’s intervention. They should be held to a common standard of performance and discipline, and they should be recognized for the very significant contribution they are making.

The progress that the United Nations is making in developing a common training curriculum is encouraging, as are initiatives under way in the European Union to establish a common training facility for its CivPol units. The United States is not as far along on the training side, but, in an interesting development, an increasing number of police are returning after one deployment to volunteer for additional deployments, and those with good records are considered for additional deployments. In effect, the United States is developing a highly trained and experienced cadre of CivPol officers. Although there is no accepted policy regarding a standby “Blue Force,” one may be in the process of creation. Whether this is a function of the individual officers’ preference or their inability to be accepted back into their local police structures after having volunteered for a CivPol mission, the result is the same: An already-professional force is becoming even more so through the requirements of international policing, and this “seeding” of the CivPol force with seasoned veterans should have a positive effect on future performance.
Using military forces to conduct military operations other than war (MOOTW) is not a new concept. Some examples from the past include the Indian Wars (1866–98), the Philippine campaign (1898–1913), the Haitian campaign (1915–34), the occupation of Germany (1944–52), the occupation of Japan (1945–52), the occupation of Korea (1953–54), Lebanon (1958, 1982–84), the Dominican Republic (1965), and the Sinai (1979–present). Thus, missions similar to present-day peace operations in the Balkans have been executed for many years.

Yet because the primary responsibility of the military is to prepare for operations in a major theater of war, training and doctrine in areas outside this primary focus have not been maintained, with the resulting need to reinvent them as new requirements emerge. Table 1 provides some insight into traditional and current missions that U.S. forces have been asked to execute in noncombat situations.

Historically, training for peace operations has been unstructured and has grown largely from experiences that were passed on to successors, adapting wartime mission skills to fit the particular area of operation. Because training time and resources are always constrained, the military must focus on its primary responsibility—preparing for and fighting in combat missions. This remains true even though the dissolution of the Soviet Union has created a paradigm shift from the traditional force-on-force scenario to more “asymmetric” threats. The U.S. Army trains for four broad missions: offense, defense, stability operations (including peace operations), and support operations.

In training for these broad missions, the Army is guided by six imperatives: doctrine, leadership, modern equipment, force mix, training, and quality personnel. Although all of these are important, doctrine provides the fundamental principles that guide military forces, or parts of forces, in support of national objectives. Training doctrine is outlined in Field Manuals (FMs) 25-100 and 25-101. The foundation of the U.S. Army’s training philosophy is that there is a direct link between tough, realistic training and success on the battlefield. In support of this philosophy, the Army has adopted nine fundamental training principles:
**Table 1.** Comparing functions of Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) and Current Peace Operations

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Traditional MOOTW Missions</th>
<th>Current Peace Operation Missions</th>
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<td>— Disarmament</td>
<td>— Disarmament and demobilization</td>
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<td>— Demobilization and reintegaration</td>
<td>— Establishing a safe and secure environment</td>
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<td>— Establishing a secure environment</td>
<td>— Election support</td>
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<td>— Election support</td>
<td>— Providing relief to refugees and internally displaced persons</td>
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<td>— Relocating/resettling displaced persons</td>
<td>— Facilitating the return of refugees</td>
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<td>— Providing relief for internally displaced persons</td>
<td>— Restoring infrastructure</td>
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<td>— Military governance</td>
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<td>— Controlling air space</td>
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<td>— Monitoring and enforcing cease-fire agreements</td>
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<td>— Protecting humanitarian-relief efforts</td>
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<td>— Investigating cease-fire violations</td>
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<td>— Enforcing sanctions</td>
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<td>— Protecting human rights</td>
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<td>— Separating combatants</td>
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Train as combined arms and service teams, ensuring that individuals, leaders, and units are proficient.

Train as you would fight, replicating conditions in the theater of operations as closely as possible.

Use appropriate doctrine extracted from FM's, mission training plans, battle drill books, soldier's manuals, and regulations.

Use performance-oriented training that adopts a hands-on approach.

Train for challenges. Doing so fosters a sense of accomplishment, initiative, enthusiasm, confidence, and an eagerness to learn.

Train to sustain proficiency so that acquired skills are not lost.

Train using multi-echelon techniques, involving various levels of the command structure wherever possible.

Train to maintain operational equipment.

Use commanders (or senior leaders in a civilian context) as primary trainers, as they are responsible for the performance of their subordinates.

Senior leaders of civilian organizations involved in peace operations must develop and communicate a clear training vision to their subordinates, ensuring that they understand their training role. In the U.S. Army, officers are primarily responsible for collective (group) training while senior noncommissioned officers are responsible for individual training.

Because training time and resources are limited, the army is forced to narrow its training focus to those mission-essential tasks that individuals and units must be able to accomplish to be successful on the battlefield. A unit's Mission Essential Task List (METL) is derived through an analysis of its responsibilities under the war plans it supports, taking into consideration all external directives and the physical conditions likely to be encountered. Once the essential tasks are selected, the commander then sets the supporting conditions and standards for each task and evaluates the unit as to its current ability to execute the tasks according to the performance standards. Based on this evaluation, tasks are rated as “trained,” “needs practice,” “untrained,” or “status unknown.” A training strategy is then developed to bring the unit up to the desired level of proficiency.

As stated earlier, the Army considers peace operations to be peripheral to its wartime mission; nevertheless, it believes that well-trained and disciplined troops also make the best peacekeepers. Units alerted for peacekeeping duty go through the same analysis and task-development cycle and develop and execute the appropriate training to improve proficiency where required. The major adjustment for peace operations comes in the level of technical knowledge and different attitudes that are required. Some skills and tasks that might require additional training are, for example:

- Conduct negotiations or mediations.
- Conduct operations to quell civil disturbances.
- Operate a checkpoint.
Conduct area-presence operations.

Process confiscated documents, equipment, and material.

Understand rules of engagement in different settings.

Conduct risk assessment.

Conduct civil-military relations.

Familiarize oneself with the region.

Conduct multinational operations.

Obviously, a peace operation environment is different from a wartime environment. In the former, commanders must account for the additional requirements of information operations—including public affairs, public diplomacy, psychological operations, civil affairs, intelligence collection, and the methods and operations of troop units—military-to-military coordination, and civil-military operations. Performed with sensitivity, the latter can enable a unit to operate successfully in an environment greatly influenced by the civilian populace, numerous NGOs, and local political authorities.

The U.S. Army has learned some things from its recent efforts in the peace operations arena. Based on the U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute’s after-action review of U.S. troop deployments in Kosovo, it was acknowledged that the predeployment training for units was adequate but that more peacetime training in peace operations requirements was necessary. Senior military leaders are not being properly prepared to handle the political-military and civilian-military aspects of peace operations. Because there is no peacekeeping training center, the army needs to establish a standard set of generic tasks, conditions, and standards to guide all units in training for peace operations. Also, lessons learned by previously deployed units should be made available; such a list would ease the requirement on individual units to assemble all needed information themselves. Finally, in the view of many, Army doctrine on peace operations needs to be updated to reflect recent experiences.

The U.S. Army is prepared to build on its peace operations experience and the analysis of its performance by updating its doctrine, increasing its peacetime training of peace operations skills, and enhancing its technology to reflect the needs of the complex environment presented by current and future peace operations.

Discussion

Ambassador H. Allen Holmes began the discussion by reiterating an observation made by Dag Hammarskjöld that peacekeeping is not a job for soldiers, but only soldiers can do it. Soldiers are trained to fight and win the nation’s wars, with other missions being of secondary importance. However, the nature of modern warfare makes it impossible to eliminate “nonmilitary” issues, and so the military, and particularly the Special Operations Forces community within the military (Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations, Special Forces), must be trained to address them. The military needs to better utilize Special Operations Forces in areas that involve interaction with the civilian population and to adapt some of their lessons learned to conventional military forces.
Colonel Tony Cuculo picked up the discussion by agreeing that the Army should train in advance for peace operations so that it can be ready for rapid deployment. However, constraints imposed by a lack of training time and money require that the focus of peacetime training remain on warfighting tasks in support of its primary mission of national defense. The credibility associated with a well-trained, well-prepared military force is valuable in any operating environment. With adequate lead time, commanders can analyze a new mission and train toward successfully integrating new knowledge and skills that might be required. It would be better if all participants in a peace operation arrived at the crisis venue knowing what to expect of each other. NGOs and federal agency personnel are increasingly being invited to train with the military in peacetime. Nonmilitary organizations need to get over their aversion to training, and funding needs to be identified to allow collective, multiagency training to take place.

Discussion from the floor covered a variety of topics. The question of training and equipping host country military forces was raised—specifically, who should be trained, in what skills, and when. Even though such training is conducted with the best of intentions, the “downstream” risks associated with creating a military potential in another society must be considered. The training opportunities presented by the Army’s mission readiness exercises were also discussed. These tend to be realistic exercises engaging civilian role-players in environments constructed to simulate operational reality. These exercises could easily be adapted as interagency, multicommunity events, with the various participants learning from one another and collectively determining how to work better together.

There was an extended discussion of how to improve the process of working together. Points of agreement included the value of common training so that capabilities and limitations are known before personnel arrive in the field, the need to better fund and support the effort of reconstructing judicial and penal systems, the need for an interagency equivalent to the military command structure, and the recognition that training needs to be evolutionary, incremental, and experiential. All organizations want some degree of empowerment to do what they believe they need to do in the area of operations. Those that are competent and know the “rules” derived from common training will be more effective more quickly than those that elect to go it alone.

Comment

More than any other organization represented at the symposium, the military has the training structure, resources, and experience needed to adapt its personnel to a new operating environment. The process of developing a METL forces senior leaders to take a hard look at a proposed mission and break it down into its essential parts, to evaluate the ability of their soldiers to accomplish those parts successfully, and to plan and execute the training necessary to raise current capabilities to the necessary levels. Something similar to this process, adapted for individual agency needs, could be employed successfully by federal agencies and NGOs seeking to establish the core competencies necessary for their success in complex-emergency situations.
The focus of military training must remain on fighting and winning the nation’s wars. However, analysis increasingly suggests that the battlefields of the twenty-first century will not be isolated, and that understanding how to interact with and manage civilians and civilian agencies in the area of operations is a critical skill set necessary to maintaining military credibility and validity of presence.

Consequently, peacetime military training is slowly evolving to incorporate features of civil interaction, accompanied by the development of a generation of future leaders that has experienced firsthand the complexities of the new “battlespace.” Lessons learned are being relearned and gradually incorporated into new doctrine. The military is reaching out to other agencies—governmental and private—in an effort to bring them together for common training, but it needs to do a better job of “selling” the combined training opportunities and explaining the value added to the agencies for them to overcome what is, in some cases, a training-averse culture.

The synergy achieved when diverse organizations understand one another and train together toward a common effectiveness is undeniable. Civilian and military roles in a complex emergency are not the same, but they are interdependent, and the training challenge in the near future is to establish a training system that is mutually supportive without blurring the important differences among organizations. A system of military exercises that are designed for nonmilitary participation already exists and could serve as the near-term bridge to similar integrating events under civilian sponsorship. While conceptually inviting, the question of who would take ownership of such an endeavor, fund it, staff it with trained and experienced personnel, and coordinate the coming together is real and profound, particularly in light of the fact that “interagency” is a somewhat amorphous concept and not a place or a thing with structure.

Difficulty aside, there is a clear need for a common training environment for the many practitioners who have been or will be engaged in responding to and interacting in a complex humanitarian environment, be it a war or something other than war. How we react to this need will determine how effective we will be in the future.
Conclusion

The symposium was brought to a close by Ambassador George Ward, director of the Training Program for the U.S. Institute of Peace. His comments encapsulated four distinct areas of the symposium’s major themes: coordination and cooperation, objectives, best practices, and communication.

In the area of coordination and cooperation, Ward noted that what had emerged from the symposium was an assertion that training for peace and humanitarian-relief operations needs to focus on the management of relationships, not only among the different organizations in the field but also within the organizations themselves. In the institutional response to a complex emergency, key relationships are in flux, with organizations reexamining their own roles and eyeing one another warily. In such an environment, it is very difficult to define training objectives and best practices. Civilian and military roles in these operations are interdependent, but they are also different, and one cannot replace the other. Establishing mutual support without blurring the lines between organizations will be difficult, because fostering interagency cooperation is as much about changing attitudes and cultures as it is about creating organizational structures.

In terms of objectives, Ward pointed out that the international response to complex emergencies increasingly has a “nation-building” component, politically incorrect as that term might be. Until there is the political will to set explicitly appropriate mission objectives and to work toward them, there will be some reluctance to institutionalizing the training that is required to achieve those objectives. Further, because peace operation objectives change over time, senior leaders of all the communities involved in these operations should not be so naïve as to believe that training objectives should remain immutable.

In discussing the core focus of the symposium, Ward observed that, in view of everything that had been said, it was tempting to assert that there are no “best practices.” That would be incorrect, however. Presenters and attendees discussed many things that worked and did not work, particularly at the tactical and operational levels.

Based on the discussion, there is a clear impression that the military does better in the training arena because it has more resources and a greater commitment. Certainly at the operational level, the military does very well in terms of organizing itself, setting objectives, and executing them. However, all organizations, including the military, are beset by a lack of coordination with other organizational components. With that in mind, one best practice might be to concentrate training, at least initially, at the operational and strategic leadership levels (that is, training more senior people). Likewise, developing standby capabilities rather than standby forces may be the best way to proceed in future peace operation training endeavors. In that regard, the UN standby force system is not working well but could be improved and extended to CivPol capability. In a related development, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe is working on enlisting civilian volunteers with specific skills, such as election monitoring, and it intends to prequalify people using a system of distance learning.
In the difficult area of consensus building and communication, Ward noted that there is no lack of good ideas about what needs to be done. Nor is there a lack of good educational institutions. Yet none of these institutions combines a vision of joint military-civilian training with a full range of disciplines, resources, and the institutional mandate needed to train jointly. Although a doctrine of civil-military “jointness” is clearly needed, there is no consensus on how to move forward. Until overall objectives and direction are firmly established, training possibilities will continue to be limited to focusing on basic conflict management skills. Going beyond a basic training curriculum will require civilian and military organizations working together to develop common operational guidelines and common essential task lists. These items, in turn, would drive a much more sophisticated and thorough process of training for peace and humanitarian-relief operations.
Clifford Aims was a CivPol officer in the UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina and has many years of experience as a police officer in the United States. Aims was a commentator on the presentations for Panel III of the symposium.

Lieutenant Colonel Brent Bankus (U.S. Army) is assigned to the U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute and wrote and presented the paper “Best Practices for Training the Military for Humanitarian and Peace Operations.”

Tish Butler is the director of the Office of Sustainable Regional Development in the U.S. Agency for International Development’s Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean and served as a commentator on the Panel II presentation.

Ray Caldwell is a program officer in the Training Program at the United States Institute of Peace and moderated the panel discussion for Panel IV.

Tonya Cook is a former adviser to UN police commissioners in Bosnia and East Timor and wrote and presented the paper “Best Practices for Training Police for Humanitarian and Peace Operations.”

Colonel Tony Cuculo (U.S. Army) is the commander of the Third Brigade Combat Team, Third Infantry Division. He was a commentator on the Panel IV presentation.

Graham Day is a former UN district administrator for East Timor and UN field representative. He prepared and delivered the presentation “Occupational Culture for International Police Officers: Implications for Training, Best Practices, and Policy.” At the time of the symposium, he was a senior fellow at the United States Institute of Peace.

Theodore Feifer is a program officer in the Training Program at the United States Institute of Peace and moderated the panel discussion for Panel II.

H. Allen Holmes is a former ambassador who has served as assistant secretary of defense for special operations and low-intensity conflict and as assistant secretary of state for political-military affairs. He was a commentator on the Panel IV presentation.

James Kunder is a former director of the U.S. Agency for International Development’s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance and is currently with the Institute for Defense Analysis in Alexandria, Virginia. He wrote and presented the paper “Best Practices for Training Government Relief and Development Personnel for Humanitarian and Peace Operations.”

Harvey J. Langholtz, Ph.D., is the director of the United Nations Institute for Training and Research’s Program of Correspondence Instruction. He wrote and presented the paper “Training for Humanitarian and Peace Operations Using a Distance Learning Methodology.”

Nancy Lindborg is executive vice president with Mercy Corps and served as a commentator on the Panel I presentations.

Kimberly M. Maynard is a former team leader with the U.S. Agency for International Development’s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance and NGO field representative. She acted as a commentator on the Panel I presentations.

Richard McCall is a consultant to the administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development and served as a commentator on the Panel II presentation.

Curtis Morris is a program officer in the Training Program at the United States Institute of Peace and moderated the discussion for Panel III.
Major General **William L. Nash** (U.S. Army, ret.) is a senior fellow and director of the Council on Foreign Relations’ Center for Preventive Action. He delivered the symposium’s keynote address.

**Robert Perito** is the deputy director of the Department of Justice’s International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program and served as a commentator on the Panel III presentations.

**Eric Scheye** is with the UN Policy and Plans Division’s Civilian Police Unit and was a commentator on the Panel III presentations.

**Robert M. Schoenhaus** is a former program officer in the Training Program at the United States Institute of Peace and acted as principal rapporteur for the symposium and author of this Peaceworks report.

**Ian Smilie** is a development consultant and wrote and presented the paper “Best Practices for Training Nongovernmental Organization Members for Humanitarian and Peace Operations.”

**Richard Solomon,** Ph.D., is a former U.S. ambassador and is president of the United States Institute of Peace. His introductory remarks opened the symposium.

**George Ward** is a former U.S. ambassador and is director of the Training Program at the United States Institute of Peace. His closing remarks concluded the symposium.

**Barbara Wein** is a former program officer in the Training Program at the United States Institute of Peace. She moderated the discussion for Panel I.
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